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INTRODUCTION
When one subsidiary in a group of companies is found by
the European Commission to have engaged in price fixing,
contrary to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”), the question arises whether the
parent company of the group should also be fined. This
question is important because the Commission considers that
when the parent is fined, the fine can be increased for
deterrence and based on the turnover of the entire group, even
if only one subsidiary was involved in the infringement. The ten
percent limit on the amount of the fine, imposed by Regulation
1/2003, Article 23, is applied to the group turnover, and not to
the turnover of the subsidiary. The rule that fines are increased
for recidivism is applied to the group, and not only to the
subsidiary.
The conventional view is that the parent company can be
fined (even if it was not involved in the infringement) when the
two companies form part of a single economic “enterprise” or
“undertaking” (so that, for example, an agreement between
them would not be regarded as an intra-enterprise conspiracy
and so not restricting competition). However, because the fines
on parent companies are so large, this view has given rise to a
large member of cases before the General Court and the
European Court of Justice (the “ECJ” and collectively with the
General Court, “the Courts”). These cases have arisen because
in practice it is not always clear whether the companies
constitute a single enterprise. There is no precise and easily used
definition of an enterprise, and different tests have been
applied. As a result, it is generally considered by practising
lawyers that it is not clear what a parent company needs to prove
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in order to avoid being fined. In the case of a wholly owned
subsidiary, there is a presumption that the two companies form
a single enterprise. This presumption is said to be rebuttable
(and to be legally permissible, it must be rebuttable), but it has
almost never been rebutted. It is therefore very difficult for a
parent company to know whether e.g., routine compliance with
company law would involve it in liability if a subsidiary infringed
Article 101. This is widely believed to be contrary to legal
certainty, and to discourage parent companies from kinds of
conduct that are either desirable or obligatory.1
So, there are two areas of uncertainty in the law: What kinds
of evidence are relevant to prove or disprove a “single
enterprise”, and how can the presumption be rebutted? More
specifically, what are the key tests of a “single enterprise”? Is it
possible in practice to rebut the presumption? If it is possible to
rebut it, what kind of proof is necessary?
I. THE PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO CASE LAW
The judgments of the General Court and of the European
Court of Justice in cases in which parent companies have been
fined by the European Commission for price fixing by their
100% subsidiaries now follow a pattern.2 The recent judgments
repeatedly say:
1. It may also create an incentive for parent companies to wholly centralize the
management of their subsidiaries, losing the benefits of local management. See Laura
La Rocca, The Controversial Issue of the Parent Company Liability for the Violation of EC
Competition Rules by the Subsidiary, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 68, 68–76 (2011).
2. See generally for comments on the recent caselaw, Stefan Thomas, Guilty of a
Fault that One Has not Committed: The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out
by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law, 3 J. EUR. COMPETITION L.
& PRAC. 11 (2012); La Rocca, supra note 1, at 68–76; Mieke Olaerts & Caroline
Cauffman, Quimica: Further Developing the Rules on Parent Company Liability, 32 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 431, 431–440 (2011). Citing primarily recent case-law, see Stora
Kopparsberg v. Commission., Case C-286/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. I-9925, ¶ 25; Akzo Nobel
and Others v. Commission., Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 58 ff; Elf
Aquitaine v. Commission., Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 1; Arkema v.
Commission., Case C-520/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8901; Elf Aquitaine v. Commission.,
Case C-404/11 P [2012]. Other cases include General Quimica and Others v.
Commission., Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-00001, ¶¶ 34–35; Cases C-201/09 P;
Arcelormittal Luxembourg v. Commission. and Commission. v. Arcelormittal
Luxembourg, C-216/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2239, ¶ 95; Joined Cases T-122/07 to T124/07, Siemens AG Österreich and VA Tech Transmission v. Commission. [2011]
E.C.R. II-0793, ¶¶ 122, 130, 135, 151; Joined Cases T-141/07 and others, General
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the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent
where, although they have separate legal personalities,
the subsidiary does not decide independently on its
conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material
respects, the instructions given by the parent, having
regard to the economic, organizational, and legal links
between them.
in this situation the two companies form a single
economic unit and therefore a single enterprise, so the
involvement of the parent in the infringement does not
need to be proved.
Technic-Otis and Others v. Commission., [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶¶ 52–90; Legris
Industries v. Commission., Case C-289/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported);
ThyssenKrupp v. Commission., Case C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I- 2359; Arcelor Mittal
Luxembourg v. Commission., Case C-201/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2239 (a former parent
company); Arkema and Others v. Commission (sodium chlorate) Case T-343/08,,
[2011] E.C.R. II-2287; Arkema, Total, Elf v. Commission (methacrylates), Case T217/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2593; Cases T-185/06, 186/06, 196/06, Air Liquide, Edison,
Solvay v. Commission. (hydrogen peroxide), [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, 2839, 2959, 3179,
3149, 3063, 3119; EI du Pont de Nemours v. Commission, Case T-76/08, [2012] E.C.R.
I___ (not yet reported); UPM Kymmene v. Commission (industrial bags), Case T53/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Total, Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case
C-421/11, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Novácke chemické závody a.s. v.
Commission (calcium Carbide), Case T-352/09, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported);
Nynäs Petroleum v. Commission, Case T-347/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported);
garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported), ¶ 22
(a case in which the presumption was not applied); Alliance One v. Commission
(Italian tobacco), Cases C-593/11, C-654/11, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported);
Tomkins v. Commission, Case C-286/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); ENI
v. Commission (synthetic rubber), Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet
reported); Parker v. Commission. (marine hoses), Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I___
(not yet reported); Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case T-199/08, [2011] E.C.R. II-2149;
Dow Chemical, Case C-499/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported), ¶ 47–48;
Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-400; FL Smidth, Case
T-65/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Total Nederland v. Commission, Case
T-348/06, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Fresh Del Monte Produce v.
Commission, Case T-587/08, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported); Groupe Gascogne
v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-____.
In Arkema and Others, Case T-217/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2593, the Court said:
[A] parent company which holds almost all of the capital of its subsidiary is,
as a general rule, in a similar situation to that of a sole owner, as regards its
power to exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary,
having regard to the economic, organizational and legal links which join it to
that subsidiary. Consequently the Commission is entitled to apply to that
situation the same evidential regime, namely to rely on the presumption that
the parent company makes effective use of its power to exercise a decisive
influence over the conduct of its subsidiary.
Id. ¶ 53.
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Where the parent has a 100% shareholding, it can
exercise a decisive influence on the subsidiary’s conduct,
and there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent
does in fact exercise a decisive influence. The
Commission does not need to show evidence of the
exercise of influence. It does however need to explain
that it relied on the presumption.3 Because the
presumption must be rebuttable, the Commission may
need to make a detailed statement of reasons for
imputing the infringement to the parent company4 and
should explain why the companies’ arguments are not
enough to rebut the presumption.
the parent company has the burden of proof to rebut the
presumption, by producing sufficient evidence to show
that the subsidiary acts independently on the market.

In fact, this presumption has never been directly rebutted.5
Repeatedly, the Courts have said that evidence and arguments
put forward by parent companies were not sufficient to rebut it.
In some cases the Courts have annulled findings that it has not
3. Grolsch, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169, ¶¶ 77–78.
4. Air Liquide, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶ 65; Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947,
¶ 153.
5. In several cases the Courts have refused to apply the presumption, on
procedural grounds. Procedural issues are not enough to make the presumption
rebuttable as a matter of substance. Air Liquide, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809; Edison v.
Commission, Case T-196/06, [2011] E.C.R II-3149; Grolsch, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169; Elf
Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947; General Quimica v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P,
[2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶¶ 60–62, 79. These cases are discussed below. The only case in
which the presumption has been held to be inapplicable on substantive grounds is
Gosselin v. Commission, Joined Cases T-208–209/08, [2011] E.C.R. II-3639. These cases
are discussed below.
Since the liability of the parent is derived from the liability of the subsidiary, it
cannot relate to a period longer than the period during which the subsidiary was
committing the infringement. Tomkins v. Commission, Case C-286/11 P, [2013]
E.C.R. I___ (not yet reported).
There have been several cases in which there has been a change in the ownership
of the subsidiary which committed the infringement, but they do not seem to clarify the
legal issues discussed here. See Thyssen Krupp Nirosta GmbH v. Commission, Case C352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R I-2359, ¶ 143 (“In principle, it is for the natural or legal person
managing the undertaking in question when the infringement was committed to
answer for that infringement, even if, at the date of the decision finding the
infringement, the operation of the undertaking was no longer his responsibility.”); see
also Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported).
It seems that the Commission has discretion as to whether to fine a parent
company. See Team Relocations v. Commission, Case C-444/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____
¶¶ 159–161 (not yet reported).
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been rebutted, but have done so essentially on procedural
grounds. It seems clear that the Courts allow the presumption to
be rebutted a little more readily than the Commission, although
the Courts do not seem to have been consistent.
In theory, it is because the parent and subsidiary form a
single enterprise for the purposes of Article 101 that the parent
can be fined.6 This can be proved either by evidence that the
parent gives instructions, or by other evidence of various kinds
showing that there is a “single enterprise” or, in the case of
100% shareholding, by the presumption that control is
exercised, unless that presumption can be rebutted.
After considering some policy considerations and some
specific issues, these questions are discussed below.
It is not always clear whether findings in the judgments of
the General Court are specific findings of fact concerning the
cases before the Court and if so, on what those findings are
based, or whether they are intended to be general statements of
law. The Court of Justice, in theory, does not make findings of
fact in appeals from the General Court.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although the Commission has never clearly stated the
policy considerations that have gradually led to the present state
of the law, the arguments for making parent companies liable
for price-fixing by wholly owned subsidiaries seem to be based
on the following assumptions:
the parent company and the group of companies will
usually be significantly larger than the company involved
in the infringement, and therefore a larger fine should
be imposed, to achieve more effective deterrence.7
if the parent company is liable and the result is a larger
fine, the parent will be under pressure to supervise the
subsidiary more strictly.
since the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary has power
to control the subsidiary, either it has done so (and
6. EI du Pont de Nemours v. Commission, Case T-76/08, [2012] E.C.R. I____(not
yet reported).
7. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 17 (“[I]t is hard to see from what particular
conduct or omission the parent company should be deterred.”).
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therefore should share the responsibility for any
infringement that has occurred) or it has deliberately
chosen not to do so (and so it should not be allowed to
escape responsibility).
wherever there are reasons for increasing the total
amount of a fine, it should be increased.
the concept of a single enterprise should be the same
under Article 101 for fining purposes as it is under the
Merger Regulation, and when dealing with the question
whether an agreement between associated companies can
restrict competition.

The Court has said8 that the presumption that the parent
exercises influence:
seeks precisely to find a balance between the
importance . . . of the objective of penalising conduct
contrary to the competition rules, in particular Article 101
TFEU, and to prevent its repetition and . . . the
requirements of certain general principles of European
Union law, such as in particular the presumption of
innocence, that penalties should be applied only to the
offender, legal certainty and the rights of the defence,
including the principle of equality of arms. It is particularly
for that reason that it is rebuttable.

In the light of the case law, that statement seems unduly
complacent.
The first cases involved evidence that the parent company
had been involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the
operations of the subsidiary. The Commission gradually came to
see that it would be simpler and easier if there were a
presumption that a parent always exercises some control over a
wholly-owned subsidiary, and could be fined on that basis,
without any need to analyse the evidence. In other words, the
development of the cases suggests that the Commission

8. ENI, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ (delivered May 8, 2013), ¶ 50; Schindler Holding v.
Commission, Case C-501/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet
reported) ¶ 108; Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 59; id. ¶ 60 (“[I]t is within the
sphere of operations of those entities against whom the presumption operates that
evidence of the lack of actual exercise of that power to influence is generally apt to be
found.”).
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gradually moved towards a more easily applied rule that would
justify higher fines.
It is useful to set out the characteristics that would be
needed for a sound and rational policy. Such a policy:
should state a rule about parent companies that have not
in fact been involved in infringements that is clear and
intelligible to business people, and should avoid as far as
possible being dependent on the details of the
companies’ arrangements and practices, because any
such dependence will lead to endless litigation.
would not penalize or discourage efforts by parent
companies to prevent their subsidiaries from infringing
the law, in particular competition law.9 A policy that
discouraged measures to ensure compliance would be
irrational and counter-productive. So instructions given
by parent companies to obey competition law ought not
to make the parent liable to fines. Instructions of that
kind have no economic content, and do not make
separate companies into a single economic “enterprise.”
should not make it difficult for the parent company to
comply with any other law applicable. Specifically, it
should not make the parent liable to fines merely because
it fulfils its normal obligations as a shareholder to hold
meetings of shareholders in the subsidiary at intervals. A
law-abiding shareholder must carry out a number of
obligations under the company law applicable to the
subsidiary.
should not make it necessary for the parent to choose
between potential liability to fines and breach of its own
obligations under the company law and stock exchange
obligations applying to the parent itself. Those
obligations require the parent to consolidate the
accounts of the subsidiary and to make statements about
the subsidiary for the accuracy and completeness of
which the parent is legally responsible, and which the
parent must be able to verify as far as necessary.
9. See GTO, General Technic, Otis and UTC v. Commission, Joined Cases T-14142, 145-46/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 85 (in which the Court considered that
measures intended to ensure compliance proved control, and made the parent
company liable); see also Schindler Holding, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered July 18, 2013)
¶ 114.
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Consolidation of accounts, and descriptive statements, do
not have direct economic consequences, and do not
create a single “enterprise.”
should not interfere with good management of the group
by the parent. Competition law should not penalize or
discourage a parent from requiring group approval for
any major financial commitment by the subsidiary.
Financial prudence should not be enough, in itself, to
lead to liability to fines. It would not be a wise policy to
discourage a parent from supervising a subsidiary in
circumstances when supervision seemed desirable.
Safeguard measures taken when problems arise are not
equivalent to routine continuing economic instructions
and control. There is nothing inherently undesirable
about close relations between parents and subsidiaries.
should not disregard the fact that some multinational
groups of companies are highly decentralized, and that
the ultimate parent does not try to exercise anything
resembling day-to-day management and control. There is
nothing inherently undesirable about decentralized
management, either.

It is not clear, even in theory, what policy principles the
case law is based on, or what a parent company ought to prove
in order to avoid liability for an infringement by its whollyowned subsidiary. This uncertainty has led to much litigation,
and the law has not become any clearer. If it were accepted that
the above tests are relevant in assessing the present state of the
law, it seems clear that it would fail the tests.
It is always undesirable in any sphere of law to have a
presumption that can be rebutted only by proving a negative,
such as, in these cases, proving that influence was not exercised
(especially as it is not clear what proof would be sufficient, or
even precisely what needs to be proved). This basic criticism is
not answered by saying that in many cases the parent has
exercised influence and so should not be able to rebut the
presumption. This is particularly undesirable when the initial
findings of fact are made by a body such as the Commission for
which it is convenient to rely on the presumption and to reject
as insufficient any evidence intended to rebut it. Confirmation
bias, which inevitably arises when the same officials draft the
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statement of objections and the decision, is particularly likely in
these circumstances.
The need to prove a negative is not easy to reconcile with
the presumption of innocence.10 That presumption is not made
inapplicable merely by saying that the two companies are, or are
presumed to be, part of one group. The two presumptions seem
incompatible, and one would assume that the presumption of
innocence, being a fundamental right, should prevail. However,
this was not accepted by the General Court in Thyssen Krupp11,
GTO General Technic,12 or Schindler13 on the formal ground that,
in theory, the presumption of influence can be rebutted.
III. ACADEMIC COMMENTS
Lawyers commenting on this case law have almost
unanimously criticized it, essentially on the grounds that the
presumption cannot in practice be rebutted, and that it is no
longer a presumption but, in reality, something close to a rule of
law.14

10. See, e.g., Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades v. Commission, Case T-496/07,
[2013] E.C.R. I____ ¶¶ 180–81 (delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported) (“La
présomption d’exercice d’une influence déterminante ne saurait être renversée par la
seule démonstration que c’est la filiale qui gère les aspects de sa politique commerciale
sans recevoir de directives à cet égard. . . . L’absence d’ordre ou d’instruction de la
société mère à la filiale en ce qui concerne sa politique d’achat ou les réunions avec les
autres membres de l’entente n’est pas non plus de nature à démontrer l’autonomie du
comportement de la filiale sur le marché . . . .”).
11. Thyssen Krupp and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-144, 147–50,
154/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-5129.
12. GTO, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977.
13. Schindler Holding, [2013] E.C.R. I ____ ¶¶ 81–84 (delivered July 18, 2013) .
14. See, e.g., Ingrid Vandenborre & Thorsten C. Goetz, Rebutting the Presumption of
Parental Liability – A Probatio Diabolica?, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO: CARTELS & LENIENCY 2012, at 17 (Global Legal Grp. ed., 2012); Bettina
Leupold, Effective Enforcement of EU Competition Law Gone Too Far? Recent Case Law on the
Presumption of Parental Liability, 34 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 570, 570–82 (2013); Yves
Botteman et al., “You Can’t Beat the Percentage” – The Parental Liability Presumption in EU
Cartel Enforcement, 2012 EUR. ANTITRUST REV. 3; John D. Briggs & Sarah Jordan,
Presumed Guilty: Shareholder Liability for a Subsidiary’s Infringements of Article 81 EC Treaty,
8 BUS. L. INT’L 1 (2007); Marco Bronckers & Anne Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty?
The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 34 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 535, 535–70 (2011); La Rocca, supra note 1; Thomas,
supra note 2.
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IV. SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES
Before considering the main questions arising, several
specific questions are worth analyzing briefly, because a variety
of different phrases have been used to describe the tests to be
applied.
the Courts have used phrases about influencing the
subsidiary’s “conduct on the market.” Presumably it is
intended to refer to the fact that the infringements
concern the subsidiary’s pricing policy. But it seems that
instructions only about e.g., investments or financial
control, without any instructions concerning pricing,
would not enable the parent to avoid liability. It is not
clear whether there can be a single enterprise if there
were proved to be no exercise of influence on the
subsidiary’s conduct “on the market.”15
what is the significance of phrases about influence “in all
material respects”? The phrase seems to be repeated
routinely without having any great significance.16 At first
sight, the phrase suggests that there might be exercise of
influence that would be immaterial and that would not
mean that the parent should be liable. It also suggests
that if there had been influence only in some material
respects, the conclusion would not be clear. But neither
suggestion is borne out by the case law. The Commission
seems to consider that instructions on any aspect of the
subsidiary’s affairs confirm, instead of rebutting, the
15. See Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 177
(delivered May 17, 2013) (not yet reported) (“[T]he conduct of the subsidiary on the
market cannot be the only factor which enables the liability of the parent company to
be established, but is only one of the signs of the existence of an economic unit.”); see
also Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-400, ¶ 74
(holding the parent company can be liable even if its influence does not concern the
“commercial policy” of the subsidiary).
16. See, e.g., Gosselin Group NV v. European Commission, Case C-440/11 [2013]
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 38 (delivered July 11, 2013) (not yet reported) (citing Akzo Nobel NV v.
European Commission, Case C-97/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 58; Alliance One
International Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 628/10 & 14/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶
43 (delivered July, 19, 2012) (not yet reported), and previous case-law) (“[I]t is the
Court’s established case-law that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the
parent company in particular where, although having a separate legal personality, the
subsidiary does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but
carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company,
having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between
those two legal entities.” (emphasis added)).
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presumption. The fact that there are some matters on
which clearly no instructions have been given (even if
those matters are “conduct on the market”) does not
seem to relieve the parent from liability.17

17. See, e.g., Keramag Keramische Werke AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 379/10
& 381/10, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 312 (delivered on Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported)
(“It is not necessary to restrict that assessment to matters relating solely to the
subsidiary’s commercial policy in the strict sense, such as the distribution or pricing
strategy. In particular, the presumption in question cannot be rebutted merely by
showing that it is the subsidiary that manages those specific aspects of its commercial
policy, without receiving instructions.”). In Groupe Gascogne SA, Case C-58/12, [2013]
E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 39–43 (delivered Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported), the ECJ found
that even though the subsidiary enjoyed “a large measure of autonomy,” it was
nevertheless under regular parental monitoring and this was sufficient to find the
existence of a single undertaking. In Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades, Case T-496/07,
[2013] (not yet reported) ¶ 179, the General Court even considered that “l’application
d’un modèle d’organisation fondé sur une philosophie de delegation maximale aux
filiales ne constitue pas un element de pruve susceptible de démontrer l’autonomie de
ces dernières. Au contraire, l’introduction et l’application d’une telle stratégie ou de
toute autre stratégie de management attestent plutôt l’existence d’un pouvoir de
contrôle effectrif.” See also Roca, Case T-412/10, [2013] ¶¶ 72–77 (not yet reported);
Laufen Austria, Case T-411/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 95–98 (not yet reported); Roca
Sanitario, Case T-408/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 95–98 (not yet reported). In Total
Raffinage Marketing v. Commission, Case T-566/08, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 501–02
(delivered on Sept 13, 2013) (not yet reported), the General Court explained its
position as follows:
[I]t should be observed that the application of the presumption that the
parent company owning all or virtually all of the capital of its subsidiary does
in fact exercise decisive influence over the commercial conduct of the
subsidiary is justified by the fact that, where the parent company is the
subsidiary’s sole shareholder, it has at its disposal all the possible means of
ensuring that the subsidiary’s commercial conduct is aligned with its own. In
particular, it is the sole shareholder that defines, in principle, the extent of
the subsidiary’s autonomy by establishing the latter’s articles of association,
chooses its management and takes or approves the subsidiary’s strategic
commercial decisions, if necessary by having representatives on the
subsidiary’s bodies. Likewise, the economic unity between the parent
company and its subsidiary is normally further protected by obligations
arising under the company law of the Member States, such as the obligation
to keep consolidated accounts, the obligation for the subsidiary to account
periodically for its activities to the parent company and also by the approval
of the subsidiary’s accounts in general meeting, consisting solely of the parent
company, which necessary means that the parent company follows, at least in
broad terms, the commercial activities of the subsidiary.
Next, it should be emphasised that in the case of a subsidiary which is
wholly, or almost wholly, owned by a single parent company, there is in
principle a single commercial interest and the members of the subsidiary’s
bodies are designated and appointed by the sole shareholder, which may give
them at least informal instructions and impose performance criteria on them.
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from phrases about “economic, organisational and legal
links” between the two companies, it seems that the
Courts consider that all the relationships between the
parent and subsidiary need to be taken into account,
presumably because a subsidiary’s conduct might be
influenced in a variety of different ways.18 That seems
reasonable, but the phrase provides little useful
guidance.19 The phrase may merely describe the overall
closeness, or otherwise, of the relationship between the
companies. It seems clear, however, in particular from
the judgments in Air Liquide20 and Elf Aquitaine,21 that the
economic relationships are more important than the
administrative, legal, or organizational ones. Sharing a
legal, tax, and insurance department with the parent
In such a case, therefore, there is necessarily a relationship of confidence
between the management of the subsidiary and the management of the
parent company and the management of the subsidiary necessarily act by
representing and promoting the only commercial interest that exists, namely
the interest of the parent company. Thus, the unity of the market conduct of
the parent company and of its subsidiary is ensured in spite of any autonomy
conferred on the management of the subsidiary as regards its operational
direction, which comes within the definition of the parent company’s
commercial policy in the strict sense. As a general rule, moreover, it is the
sole shareholder that defines, on its own and according to its own interests,
the procedure whereby the subsidiary takes decisions and that determines the
subsidiary’s operational autonomy, which it may change on its own initiative
by amending the rules governing the functioning of the subsidiary or in the
context of a restructuring, or indeed by setting up informal decision-taking
structures.”
18. See La Rocca, supra note 2.
19. In the Opinon of Advocate General Kokott, Alliance One, [2012] E.C.R. I____,
¶¶ 146, 158, the Advocate General said that if the presumption is relied on the links
must make it appear likely that the parent in fact exercised decisive influence. This
would mean that the presumption, by itself, would not be sufficient. See also Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶ 87, 91. Depending on the
circumstances, an influence over human resources, investment, legal acts, and any
strategic influence even short of operational management might be relevant. The
judgment in garantovaná a.s. v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 31
(delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported), mentioned influencing pricing policy,
production, distribution, sales objectives, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow, stocks,
marketing, and coordinating roles. Clearly a parent which influenced such matters
would be part of a single enterprise. Influence on strategic decision-making is indeed
sufficient. See EI du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Commission, Case C-172/12, [2013]
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 52 (delivered 26 Sept, 2013) (not yet reported).
20. L’Air Liquide SA v. Commission, Case T-185/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶¶ 67–
80.
21. Elf Aquitaine SA v. Commission, Case C-521/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 160–
68.

1494 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1481
company would be compatible with economic autonomy.
This makes sense. The question is whether the two
companies form a single economic unit, not an
administrative unit.
does the concept of a “single economic unit” or a “single
enterprise” add to or clarify the position?22 If the parent
and the subsidiary are in entirely different product
markets, as in Air Liquide, it seems meaningless to speak
of them being a single economic unit. However this
argument was rejected in Eni.23 The concept of an
“enterprise” does not seem useful either, since (unless
the presumption is impossible to rebut) the fact that the
parent owns the subsidiary is irrelevant. It is not clear
whether the test is really behavioral, or structural.
is the test being applied one which depends on whether
the parent in fact exercised influence, or is it enough that
the parent could have exercised influence? If it were
enough that the parent could have exercised influence,
the 100% parent would always be liable, unless there were
contractual or other legal reasons (e.g., insolvency or
receivership) which made any influence impossible. In
Eni,24 the Court said that it is “the prerogatives of a parent
company… which [enable] that parent company, except in
exceptional circumstances, to exercise decisive influence over the
conduct of its subsidiary.”25 In previous cases the Courts
22. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237, ¶¶ 88–89,
93 (“In quite general terms, attribution of conduct as between parent and subsidiary is
always possible where both form one economic entity, that is, where they are to be
regarded as a single undertaking; in other words, responsibility under antitrust law is
attributed to the a parent company in view of the unity of the group thus formed . . .
instructions are merely a particularly clear indication of the existence of the parent
company’s decisive influence over its subsidiary’s commercial policy. However,
autonomy of the subsidiary cannot necessarily be inferred from their absence.”); id. ¶
65 (on “economic, organizational and legal links”); see also EI du Pont de Nemours,
[2012] E.C.R. II-___ (following Akzo, but dealing with a joint venture); Dow Chemical
Co. V. Commission, Case T-77/08, [2012] E.C.R. II-___ (delivered Feb. 2, 2012) (not
yet reported).
23. Eni SpA v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-____, ¶ 65 (delivered
May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).
24. Id. ¶ 67.
25. Emphasis added. As shown by Leupold, supra note 14, the Courts have often
relied on a mere power to influence in order to find parent companies liable for the
infringement of their subsidiaries. For example, in HSE v. Commission, Case T-399/09,
[2013] E.C.R. II-___ , ¶ 99 (delivered Dec. 13 2013) (not yet reported), the General
Court considered that:
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had said that it was not the power to influence, but the
actual exercise of influence, which counts.26

It is not clear whether the “influence” criterion and the
“single enterprise” criterion are equivalent, or whether both
need to be complied with, or whether they are considered
alternatives, so that the parent would be liable if it either
exercised influence or could be shown to be part of a single
enterprise. The better interpretation seems to be that the single
enterprise concept is the basic concept and is the explanation
for the “influence” criterion and the presumption.27 In Arcelor
It is not the content of any instructions that TDR’s supervisory board –
primarily controlled by the applicant’s representatives – may have addressed
to TDR’s management that is relevant, but rather the fact that the supervisory
board and the applicant had detailed knowledge of TDR’s business
operations and, following discussion, made comments in that respect,
regardless of whether those comments should be qualified as instructions.
Such a situation is sufficient (see also paragraph 93 above) to show the
exercise of control and, consequently, of a decisive influence by the
applicant, through TDR’s supervisory board, over TDR’s behaviour on the
market.
See also Laufen Austria, Case T-411/10, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶¶ 92–93 (not yet
reported); CEPSA v. Commission, Case T-497/07, [2013] E.C.R. II____, ¶ 178
(delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported), where the Court considered that “le
simple fait [que la société mère] dispose d’un pouvoir de révocation des
administrateurs de PROAS, ce qui n’est pas contesté, est susceptible d’exercer sur eux
une influence déterminante.” The impossibility to rebut the presumption of decisive
influence if it also entails the possibility to exert decisive influence, and thereby renders
meaningless evidence of abstention, has been underlined by several commentators,
including Nils Wahl, Parent Company Liability – A Question of Facts or Presumption?, 19 ST.
GALLEN INT’L COMPETITION L. F. (June 7–8, 2012).
26. Some EU cases stated that the Commission cannot impute liability to a parent
company merely because it is in a position to exercise decisive influence over its
subsidiary, but must check whether that influence is actually exercised (but not that the
parent exercised that influence in connection with the illegal conduct). Later
judgments, however, have eroded this principle. See Kendrion NV, Case C-50/12 P,
[2013] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported); see, e.g., Stora Kopparbergs Berslaga AB v.
Commission, Case C-286/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-9925, ¶¶ 27–29; Bolloré SA v.
Commission, Joined Cases 109, 118, 122, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, & 138/02, [2007]
E.C.R. II-947, ¶ 132; contra garantovaná a.s. v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012]
E.C.R. II____, ¶ 29 (delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported) (restating the principle
that the Commission cannot merely show that the parent was able to exercise decisive
influence, but must show either by evidence or by relying on the presumption, that it
did so).
27. In the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Alliance One v. Commission,
Joined Cases 628/10 & 14/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, Advocate General Kokott said:
According to settled case-law, whether a parent company can be held liable
for its subsidiary’s cartel offences in fact depends on a single condition only:
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Mittal, the Court said “where the parent company exercises
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary, especially
its anticompetitive conduct, it is the undertaking consisting of
the parent company and the subsidiary which is liable for the
infringement.”28 In short, “influence” and “single enterprise”
should probably be regarded as one test, not two.
in several cases the parent companies have argued that
they are only “holding” companies that do not, and are
not intended to, involve themselves in the operations of
their subsidiaries. One would think that this was a
question of fact in each case. But the Courts have made
general statements about holding companies which
would be surprising if they were intended to be
universally true, either as statements of fact or of law,
since the phrase “holding company” covers such a very
wide variety of situations. A “holding company” may be
essentially passive, and may not be liable for that reason,
as explained below.29
in some cases the parent company has argued that it has
sought to influence the subsidiary’s conduct only to
ensure that the subsidiary complied with all the legal
rules applying to it, including of course competition law
rules. It seems that this has been treated, by the
Commission and by the General Court in the Elevators
case30, as evidence confirming the presumption, and not
rebutting it.
The parent company must have exercised decisive influence on the conduct
of the subsidiary, so that the subsidiary was unable to make independent
decisions as to its conduct on the market.
Id. ¶ 144. It does not now seem correct to say that there is only a single condition.
28. ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v. Commission, Joined Cases 201/09 & 216/09
[2011] E.C.R. I-2239, ¶ 101.
29. In Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393, a company
described as an investment company was held liable for the actions of its 100%
subsidiary, on the basis of the presumption and several items of evidence relied on by
the Commission. The parent company received monthly financial reports and an
annual budget. The Court said that the fact that the parent intended to sell the
subsidiary might be evidence of a single enterprise, since the parent would wish to
make the subsidiary more profitable. That would suggest that a conglomerate hedge
fund would be liable but not a conglomerate holding company. The company appealed
to the Court of Justice in Case C-50/12 P. See also General Technic-Otis Sárl v.
Commission, Joined Cases 141, 142, 145 and 146/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 84
(repeating the factual generalization made in Schunk, [2008] E.C.R. II-2567).
30. General Technic–Otis, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977.
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in some cases the parent company has argued that it has
never exercised any influence over the normal operations
of the subsidiary, but that its influence has been limited
to authorising major financial commitments that the
subsidiary wished to make. The Courts have not so far
accepted that the parent has exercised no relevant
influence in such situations.31
A number of factors have been held not sufficient to
rebut the presumption, but it is not clear whether they
never could be enough, or whether they were merely
insufficient or insufficiently proved in the cases in
question. The factors that have been found insufficient,
apart from those already mentioned, include the absence
of interlocking board members.32 More seriously, the fact
that influence was exercised only on non-operational
matters was not enough to rebut the presumption.33

V. THE KEY TESTS OF A “SINGLE ENTERPRISE”: DEGREES OF
AUTONOMY
Agreements between companies 100% under the same
control cannot infringe Article 101 TFEU, since it would be
unrealistic to try to insist that they should compete with one
another, and an agreement may merely be equivalent to an
internal allocation of functions. They are regarded for this
purpose as a single enterprise. But, that is clearly a different
question from the issue of liability of a parent company, and
does not necessarily seem relevant here.
The difficulty is to identify criteria for deciding whether the
subsidiary has sufficient autonomy, either generally or in
whatever respects may be considered relevant, for the

31. Total and Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case T-190/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-5513;
ENI v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013)
(not yet reported) (the subsidiary must be shown to have acted with complete
autonomy not only at operational but also at financial level). But see L’Air liquide v.
Commission, Case T-185/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809.
32. ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs v. Commission, Joined Cases 144/07, 14750/07 & 154/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-5129. In garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09,
[2012] (delivered Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported), the fact that a majority of the
directors of the subsidiary were appointed by the parent was conclusive proof of
exercise of influence.
33. Total and Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. II-5513.
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companies not to constitute a single enterprise.34 Since no
criteria have been suggested for this purpose, except the
unsatisfactory tests of “instructions” (which is clearly only one
kind of evidence of a single enterprise), it seems better to ask
whether certain activities should or should not be regarded as
creating or suggesting a single enterprise, and this approach is
used below.
Autonomy, like “full function” in merger law, is necessarily
a question of degree and not of kind, and a subsidiary may be
autonomous in some respects and not in others, or more
autonomous at some times than at others. It is not even clear
whether it is the behavior of the parent or of the subsidiary that
should be looked at, or the nature of the relationship, and the
test of “all the links” between the two companies is not a useful
one. It would not seem natural to describe companies in entirely
different product markets as forming one enterprise, but that
leaves open the question of financial supervision. In Eni,35
financial influence was said to be enough to make the parent
liable even though the parent had never been in the subsidiary’s
market. If it is the closeness of the “general relationship” that
matters,36 it is not clear how that should be measured or
assessed.

34. An enterprise is a “unitary organization of personal, tangible and intangible
elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long term basis,” regardless of
how it is financed and of its legal form. HFB and Others v. Commission, Case T-9/99,
[2002] E.C.R. II-1487, ¶¶ 54, 66. This definition does little to answer the questions
discussed here. In GTO, General Technic, Otis and UTC, Joined Cases T-141-2/07 and
145-6/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶ 54, the Court said “the test is whether or not there is
unity in their conduct on the market . . . whether two companies . . . . form or fall
within one and the same undertaking or economic entity adopting the same course of
conduct on the market.” In Aristrain v. Commission, Case C-196/99 P, [2003] E.C.R I11005, ¶ 99 the Court stated that:
The simple fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies
is held by the same person or the same family is insufficient, in itself, to
establish that those two companies are an economic unit with the result that,
under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be
attributed to the other and that one can be held liable to pay a fine for the
other.
Id.
35. ENI, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65 (delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).
36. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel and Others v. Commission, Case
C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-08237, ¶ 94.
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When the issue is whether a joint venture is “full function”
or not under the Merger Regulation, the distinction is merely
procedural. But, in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship,
the question of autonomy is substantive, and may make a great
deal of difference to the result. Since autonomy is such a
difficult concept to apply with any degree of confidence, some
guiding principles are needed. Since these necessitate some
generalizations about facts as well as law, the Commission is best
placed to state these principles. It has never done so.
VI. IS IT POSSIBLE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION? THE
PROCEDURAL STANDARD FOR REBUTTAL
The Courts have repeatedly said that the presumption of
control over a 100% subsidiary can be rebutted. But since they
have not so far directly accepted that it has been, and they have
never said clearly how it could be rebutted, these statements do
not clarify the position.37 The fact that it could be rebutted in
theory, if that were so, would not be enough if it could not be
rebutted in practice.38
The Courts have ruled that parent companies should not
be held liable, in several cases, on procedural grounds,
essentially failure to state reasons. However, as shown by B.
Leupold, the Commission should be able to discharge the duty
to provide reasons “with ease because the standard imposed by
the Courts is very low.”39 In General Quimica40 the Court of
37. The Courts have dismissed applicants’ attempts to rebut the presumption in
many instances, including in Kendrion v. Commission, Case C-50/12 P, [2013] E.C.R.
I____ (delivered Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported); Dow Chemical and Others v.
Commission, Case C-499/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet
reported); Villeroy & Boch Austria, Case T-373-4/10, T-382/10 and T-402/10, [2013]
(delivered Sept. 16, 2013) (not yet reported). Commentators have underlined the
difficulty or impossibility of rebutting the presumption of decisive influence. See, e.g.,
Thomas, supra note 2; La Rocca, supra note 1, at 68.
38. The Commission itself has admitted that it might sometimes be appropriate
not to apply the presumption. For example, in Alliance One International v. Commission,
Case C-679/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 41–42 (delivered September 26, 2013) (not
yet reported), the ECJ explained that the Commission had waived reliance on the
presumption because it did not have enough evidence that the parent in fact exercised
decisive influence over its subsidiary. See also Alliance One International v. Commission,
Case C-668/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 42–44 (delivered September 26, 2013) (not yet
reported).
39. See Leupold, supra note 14.
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Justice overruled the General Court. The Court of Justice said
that the lower Court had simply found that the parent
company’s order to the subsidiary to cease any practice which
might infringe competition rules:
was sufficient in itself to prove that [the parent] exercised a
decisive influence over [the subsidiary’s] policy, not only on
the market but also as regards the unlawful conduct. In
doing that, the General Court limited itself to merely
asserting a principle, without setting out in a clear and
unequivocal manner the grounds that led it to that
conclusion.

The General Court had also failed to conduct a concrete
examination of the evidence. The fine on the parent company
was annulled.
In Air Liquide,41 the General Court held that the
Commission had not addressed the arguments put forward by
the company, and had not set out the reasons why those
arguments were inadequate to rebut the presumption. They
could not be regarded as insignificant. They were concrete items
of evidence. “The Commission’s duty to state reasons for its
decision on the issue is clearly evident from the rebuttable
nature of the presumption . . . . No assessment by the
Commission of the evidence at issue is apparent from the
grounds of the contested decision.” In Air Liquide, none of the
subsidiary’s directors were members of the parent’s
management board. The subsidiary’s directors had very wide
powers. The subsidiary had its own commercial, marketing,
human resources, information technology, and accounts
departments. It used the parent’s legal, tax, and insurance
departments, but paid for their services. It leased its offices from
the parent. It managed several other companies separately from
the rest of the group. Its activities were very far removed from
those of the rest of the group. Only the subsidiary’s employees
took price decisions and initiated large commercial projects,
decided on its budget, dealt with customer relations, and
handled relations with the industry federation. There was no
evidence that the parent gave any instructions to the subsidiary.
40. General Química and Others v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I0001, ¶¶ 60–62, 78.
41. L’Air liquid, [2011] E.C.R. II-2809, ¶¶ 68–80.
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The Commission had merely said that the company’s arguments
did not rebut the presumption, without giving any reason,
except that the parent company had power to appoint the
subsidiary’s directors. The Court, understandably, said this failed
to say why the presumption was not rebutted, since the
company’s arguments “cannot be regarded as insignificant.” The
Commission should have adopted a position on the company’s
arguments. The failure to give reasons in the decision could not
be remedied in the course of the proceedings in the General
Court. In short, the Commission’s decision was superficial and
obviously inadequate, and there was ample evidence of the
subsidiary’s economic autonomy. The subsidiary had neither
sought or received instructions from the parent, but ran its own
business without the parent being involved. In Edison,42 the
General Court annulled the same decision of the Commission
insofar as it found another parent company liable, again for
failure to assess the company’s evidence. The General Court’s
judgment was upheld on appeal to the Court of Justice.43
In Grolsch,44 the General Court held that the Commission
had insufficient evidence of the involvement of the company in
the infringement.
In Elf Aquitaine,45 the Court of Justice said that because the
Commission relied on the presumption, it was obliged to
explain why the company’s evidence was not sufficient to rebut
the presumption. The Commission is required to do this, in
order to prevent the presumption from becoming irrebuttable.
The Commission’s series of simple statements and denials,
repetitive and unsupported, was not enough. In Elf Aquitaine,
the Court noted that46 the parent argued that it was only a
holding company without operational activities, that the
subsidiary was not under its instructions, did not keep the
parent informed, did not require approval before making
contracts, was financially independent, and determined its
42. Edison v. Commission, Case T-196/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-3149.
43. Commission v. Edison, Case C-446/11 [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Dec. 5,
2013) (not yet reported)
44. Koninklijke Grolsch v. Commission, Case T-234/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-6169.
45. Elf Aquitaine v. Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 144–
70.
46. Id. ¶ 160.
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strategy independently. So, the Commission’s series of
unsupported statements were not enough to rebut the
presumption. These arguments were similar to those made
successfully before the General Court in Edison and, indeed, the
Court of Justice relied heavily on Elf Aquitaine in dismissing the
Commission’s appeal.47
In Parker the Court said “the applicants are not required to
adduce direct and irrefutable evidence of the subsidiary’s
independent conduct on the market, but, failing that, they must
submit a body of precise and consistent evidence showing that
the subsidiary acted independently.”48 This is the closest that the
Courts have come to explaining the burden of proof, but it is
not clear what the “precise and consistent” evidence needs to
prove.
VII. IF THE PRESUMPTION CAN BE REBUTTED, IN WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES?
The judgments of the two Courts, as distinct from the
Opinions of two Advocates General, have given little general
indication of the nature of the circumstances in which the
parent company can rebut the presumption. The question
whether the presumption has been rebutted is primarily a
question of fact to be decided by the General Court, against
which there is normally no appeal to the Court of Justice.49
Almost the only recent indication is found in a footnote in
the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Akzo.50 It reads:
The Commission correctly mentions the following examples
in this regard: (a) the parent company is an investment
company and behaves like a pure financial investor (b) the
parent holds 100% of the shares in the subsidiary only
temporarily and for a short period (c) the parent company
47. Edison, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 24–31 (delivered Dec. 5, 2013).
48. Parker v. Commission, Case T-146/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 184 (delivered
May 17, 2013) (not yet reported). However, the Court went on to describe the claims
made by Parker as “scarcely credible.” Id. ¶ 191.
49. Legris Indus. v. Commission, Case C-289/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (delivered
May 3, 2012) (not yet reported).
50. Akzo Nobel NV & Others v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R I8237, ¶ 67. This Opinion and that of Advocate General Warner were mentioned in
garantovaná v. Commission, Case T-392/09, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 50–52 (delivered
Dec. 12, 2012) (not yet reported).
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is prevented for legal reasons from fully exercising its 100%
control over the subsidiary; see also the examples cited by
Advocate General Warner in his Opinion in Commercial
Solvents. . . .

These examples need to be analysed. It is not clear what
behaving “like a pure financial investor” would mean in the case
of a 100% shareholder. A minority shareholder may be entirely
passive, never exercising its right to vote on any subject. But that
course of action is not open to a 100% shareholder, which is
required, by the company law applying to the subsidiary, e.g., to
arrange and vote at an annual shareholders’ meeting.
Presumably a “pure financial investor” means a company that
only holds the shares in the subsidiary in question and does
nothing to influence the decisions of the subsidiary’s directors.
But in Arkema, the Court said that showing that the parent is
“non-operational” may not be enough to rebut the
presumption.51
A parent company that intended to hold 100% only
temporarily, and did so only for a short period, might
presumably succeed in being entirely passive, depending on
when it became necessary to hold the shareholders’ meeting.
A 100% parent company might be “prevented for legal
reasons” from exercising control if, for example, it had agreed
that the subsidiary should be managed entirely by another
company, or if as a result of insolvency, receivership or
expropriation the control over the subsidiary had been taken
away from it. If, as may perhaps be true, the presumption can
only be rebutted if the parent is “prevented for legal reasons”
from exercising any influence, this possibility may be important
in determining whether the presumption is permissible in other
circumstances.
All three examples given by Advocate General Kokott seem
relatively unusual, and seem to have little practical relevance.
There is no record of any of them ever having been relied on
successfully.
The Opinion of Advocate General Warner in Commercial
Solvents in 1974 suggested that an insurance company, or a
51. Arkema, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 48 (delivered Sept. 29, 2011); see Kendrion,
Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393 (not yet reported).
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trustee of a pension fund, might be able to rebut the
presumption.52 However, in practice such investors hardly ever
acquire 100% of the shares of a trading company. Advocate
General Warner seems to have envisaged that such a company
could be a purely passive investor. He also mentioned the
situation in which a 100% shareholder might in reality be
involved in a joint venture in which the other company would
have the right to control.
In short, there may be only two kinds of situations in which
it is clear that the presumption can be rebutted: if the parent
was a purely passive investor for a brief period or if there was a
clear legal reason why the parent was legally unable to exercise
any influence. The first situation is unrealistic in the case of a
100% shareholder. The second situation is so unusual that it is
not clear that the presumption could be justified by reference to
it.
In these circumstances Gosselin is of interest, although the
facts were unusual in two respects, and unlikely to be repeated.53
On appeal from the General Court, the Court of Justice held
that it was irrelevant that the parent shareholder was a
foundation (and was therefore not itself an “enterprise”): it
could still be fined. The Court then held that the General Court
had erred in law in finding that the presumption had been
rebutted. The General Court was wrong to hold that the fact
that the parent had adopted no management decisions during
the relevant period rebutted the presumption. All the relevant
factors, not only those resulting from company law, should be
taken into account. Parent and subsidiary may be a unit on an
informal basis consisting inter alia of personal links. The entities
against which the presumption operates are those best placed to
seek the evidence to rebut it within their own sphere of activity.
Instead of referring the case back to the General Court, the
Court rather surprisingly concluded that, as a factual issue, the
presumption had not been rebutted.
52. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents v. Commission,
Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 225, at 262; see Ministero dell’Economia v. Cassa
di Risparmio di Firenze, Case T-386/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-289.
53. Gosselin Grp. v Commission, Joined Cases T-208/08 & T-209/08, [2011]
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 40 (delivered July 11, 2013) (not yet reported); Commission v. Gosselin
Grp., Case C-440/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. II-3639.
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In the Italian Banking Foundation case the Advocate General
summarised one aspect of the law concisely.54 “Banking
foundations will qualify as undertakings for the purposes of
Community law in two cases: first, if they themselves carry out an
‘economic activity’ within the meaning of the case law and/or,
second, if they are directly or indirectly involved in the
management of undertakings which perform such an economic
activity.” The Court went on to say that being a shareholder is
not enough to create a single enterprise “the mere fact of
holding shares, even controlling shareholdings, is insufficient to
characterise as economic an activity of the entity holding those
shares, when it gives rise only to the exercise of the rights
attached to the status of shareholder or member, as well as, if
appropriate, the receipt of dividends, which are merely the fruits
of the ownership of an asset.”55
Alliance One was a joint venture case, and the Court held
that one parent was not liable because its shareholding was
“purely financial.”56 However, it does not seem that a 100%
shareholding could be regarded in this way, at least not for long.
On appeal, in Alliance One Advocate General Kokott said
that the parent company could rebut the presumption “by
showing that it exercised restraint and did not influence its subsidiary’s
conduct on the market.”57 But it is not clear how a parent can prove
that it “exercised restraint” or when the restraint shows that the
two companies do not form a single enterprise.
In Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje the ECJ overruled
the General Court’s finding that the applicant could rebut the
presumption on the basis that the parent company had not
54. Ministerio dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassadi Risparmio di Firenze,
Case C-222/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-289, ¶¶ 73, 111–12, 117–18. This was a State aid case,
but the Court in Gosselin considered it to be relevant.
55. Id. ¶ 111. But see ENI v. Commission, Case C-508/11, [2013] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 68
(delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).
56. Alliance One, Case T-24/05, [2010] E.C.R. II-5329; see Commission Decision
236/EC, 2007 O.J. L 102/14 (adopted, however, before the law was clarified by the Akzo
judgment in 2009).
57. Alliance One International v. Commission, Joined Cases C-628/10 P & C14/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 171 (delivered July 19, 2012) (not yet reported). In
ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v. Commission, Joined Cases 201/09 & 216/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I-2239, the Court stated that the parent could show that “its subsidiary acts
independently on the market.” Id. ¶ 98. This suggests that it would be enough to show
that the subsidiary acted regularly without instructions, as in Air Liquide.
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adopted any formal management decision during the period for
which it was held jointly and severally liable for payment of the
fine.58 The ECJ relied on the informal and personal links
between the parent and the subsidiary. This extends the
presumption of decisive influence to personal links between the
two legal entities.59
In Total SA, the General Court said with regard to 100%
subsidiaries “There is in principle a single commercial interest
and the members of the organs of the subsidiary are chosen and
appointed by the single shareholder which can give them at least
informal instructions and impose performance criteria on
them.”60 As a result, parent companies are left with the difficult
task to prove that these mechanisms did not operate.61
It would be unreasonable to criticise the Courts for not
having given a comprehensive list of situations in which the
presumption can be rebutted. But the consequences of the
language used so far are not clear, and it is obvious that it is
giving rise to a great deal of litigation, which the Courts would
certainly prefer to avoid.
The fact that it is so difficult in practice to rebut the
presumption is convenient for the Commission, which finds it
very easy to reject the arguments of parent companies,
sometimes on unconvincing grounds. It therefore seems
unlikely that the Commission will try to clarify the legal position,
unless the Courts continue to insist on the Commission giving
detailed reasons for its conclusions. Institutions such as the
Commission have an unavoidable tendency to interpret rules to
suit their own convenience.
In these circumstances it is not clear how the law might be
clarified, and it may be useful to consider a new analysis, on the
lines set out below, under “typical parent companies’
situations.”
58. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, Case C-440/11 P, [2013] E.C.R.-I___
¶¶ 65–68.
59. In that regard, the General Court considered in HSE v. Commission, Case T399/09, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 76 (delivered Dec. 13, 2013) (not yet reported), that it
would not have made sense for the applicant to appoint the majority of the members of
its subisidiary’s supervisory board if they were intended to behave independently.
60. Translation provided by Author.
61. Total v. Commission, Case T-548/08, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 41–44 (delivered
Sept. 13, 2013) (not yet reported).
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VIII. THE DUTY TO GIVE REASONS
In the series of judgments of the Court of Justice and the
General Court, the need to analyse precisely the evidence
intended to rebut the presumption has been stressed. These
judgments should make it necessary for the Commission to
develop some criteria for measuring the extent of a subsidiary’s
autonomy and the weight of the evidence said to show it. The
language in the judgments seems to imply that the Courts
considered the companies’ evidence was strong, although the
character and importance of the evidence may vary depending
on the specific characteristics of each individual case.62 If the
Commission does not develop some criteria, much further
litigation is inevitable. “It all depends on all the circumstances”
cannot be a satisfactory approach.
It seems from Air Liquide, Elf Aquitaine, and Edison that the
Commission will be required to do a better job in future of
explaining its reasons, in its decisions. It will also be obliged to
give the companies an opportunity to comment on its reasons,
during the administrative procedure. The question of the
liability of a parent company should not be dealt with in a facile
way, or as an afterthought. The Court now has made it clear that
the Commission must make the presumption genuinely
rebuttable, by considering the facts of each case carefully. All of
the features described in Elf Aquitaine, Edison, and Air Liquide
are commonly found in groups of companies. The judgments in
these cases seem clearly to imply that many parent companies
should be able to show that they only are not part of the same
single economic enterprise as their subsidiaries, provided that
they avoid involvement in the subsidiaries’ activities. If the
Commission is to avoid having further decisions against parent
companies annulled, it will need to follow proper procedure, to
deal thoroughly with all the companies’ evidence, and to give
reasons in detail for its conclusions. These judgments impose a
stricter burden on the Commission than has been generally
realised.
62. Akzo Nobel NV & Others v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R I8237, ¶¶ 73–74; General Quimica, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 77
(delivered Jan. 20, 2011) (not yet reported); Elf Aquitaine, Case C-521/09 P, [2011]
E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 58.
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To make the presumption genuinely rebuttable, the
Commission must carefully and objectively consider all the
arguments and evidence put forward to rebut it. It is not enough
for the Commission merely to point to one or two factors that
suggest a single enterprise, as it did unsuccessfully in Air Liquide.
Clear cases in which all the evidence points in one direction may
be unusual, and factors pointing in different directions may
often have to be weighed against one another. The companies’
evidence must not be simply brushed aside. This has not always
been done correctly or consistently in the past, even by the
Courts.63 The Commission should accept that in cases such as
Air Liquide the overwhelming weight of evidence is in favor of
autonomy: if the subsidiary in that case were not autonomous, it
is hard to imagine a case in which any subsidiary would be. The
Commission must not give excessive weight to the presumption.
The Courts will apparently no longer accept superficial
statements by the Commission. But it is also clear that the Court
of Justice is reluctant to accept evidence as sufficient to rebut
the presumption.
If a parent company can show that it has no involvement in
the subsidiary’s affairs, as in the cases just summarised, the
position is, or ought to be, clear. There are, however, a number
of common situations in which the parent has taken some
action, even though the action has no economic effects, and
these situations are considered below. Before doing so, however,
what seem to be the far-reaching terms of a recent judgment of
the Court of Justice must be considered. It is not clear whether
this judgment is consistent with Alliance, Elf Aquitaine, Edison,
and Air Liquide.
IX. THE ENI JUDGMENT 64
The ENI case seems to have made it even more difficult to
rebut the presumption. The case concerned a cartel involving
synthetic rubber. The parent company put forward a number of
factual arguments intended to show that its influence was not
63. General Quimica, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001; General Technic-Otis, Case T-141/07,
142/07, 145/07 & 146/07, [2011] E.C.R. II-4977, ¶¶ 82–90.
64. ENI v. Commissionn, Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 64–68
(delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).
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sufficient to justify it being fined. All of these arguments were
rejected. The Court of Justice held that the fact that the parent
company was merely a technical and financial coordinator,
providing financial assistance and exercising budgetary control,
was not enough to relieve the parent of liability. It was irrelevant
that the parent had never operated directly in the chemical
sector in which the subsidiary was active, and that there had
been no overlap in the management personnel of the two
companies. It was enough, apparently, that the parent could
have coordinated investments, without participating in
management.65 To rebut the presumption, Eni would have
needed to show that the subsidiary “could act with complete
autonomy not only at the operational level but also at the
financial level.”66
It was also irrelevant that the parent “did not have
information on the strategic and commercial plans or on their
implementation and was not involved in the decision-making
processes to define strategic and commercial plans or annual
sales volumes and prices, in so far as they relate only to the
operational activities in the chemical sector.”
Eni had argued that “it held only the typical prerogatives of
a principal shareholder and that the fact of holding them does
not in itself amount to the exercise of a decisive influence over
the conduct of the subsidiary.” But the Court said “that the
presumption of decisive influence rests on the fact that it is
precisely the prerogatives of a parent company which wholly or
almost wholly owns its subsidiary which enables that parent
company, except in exceptional circumstances, to exercise
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary.” This seems
to mean that a parent company is fined because it was able to
exercise decisive influence, whether it did so or not. It seems to
be implied that “exceptional circumstances” would be situations

65. HSE, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 76 (delivered Dec. 13, 2013) (holding by the
General Court, which considered in paragraph 80 that “it is not necessary that the
former intervene decisively in the latter’s day-to-day management and commercial
policy stricto sensu . . . the parent company’s influence over the subsidiary’s strategy may
suffice”); see Dow Chemical Company, Case C-179/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64
(delivered Sept. 26, 2013) (not yet reported).
66. Butadiene Rubber, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013).
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in which the parent company had no legal power to exercise
influence.
But the Court, nevertheless, went on to say, contrary to the
impression given by the case law, that the presumption can be
rebutted:
Nor does that interpretation of the scope of the
presumption of actual decisive influence, applied by the
Commission and confirmed by the General Court,
transform that presumption into an irrebuttable
presumption. The fact that it is difficult to prove the
opposite in order to rebut a presumption does not imply, of
itself, that it is in fact irrebuttable . . . .

This judgment certainly suggests that there are very few
circumstances in which a parent company might be able to show
that it should not be fined. But it cannot be said that the
judgment clarifies the legal position in any other respect. It may
now be useful to consider a number of typical situations in the
light of the Eni judgment.
X. TYPICAL PARENT COMPANIES’ SITUATIONS AND ACTIONS
UNDER COMPANY LAW – A METHODICAL APPROACH
The objective of a rational policy should not be to fine the
parent irrespective of how it has behaved, although that is close
to being the legal position today, at least in the view of the
Commission. It is therefore useful to consider a number of
normal situations in which parent companies find themselves.
XI. IF THE PARENT DID NOTHING
It must be assumed that a parent company that has never
done anything cannot be fined. There are several reasons for
this. A company cannot do less than nothing, so if a completely
inactive parent could be fined, the presumption would be
irrebuttable, and every parent company would always be liable.
Two Advocates General have said that passive companies could
not be fined.67 The Court’s comment in Arkema68, that it is not
67. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237;
Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Commercial Solvents, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73,
[1974] E.C.R. 223.
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enough to prove that the parent is “non-operational,” is
imprecise, and does not seem to apply to a company that has
never taken any action of any kind. A completely inactive parent
company cannot have a close relationship with its subsidiary.
XII. COMPLIANCE WITH MINIMUM OBLIGATIONS OF
SHAREHOLDERS
It is not clear, in the light of the comments in ENI and the
conclusions in Gosselin, whether the mere fact that the parent
company complies with its minimum obligations as the
shareholder in the subsidiary is enough to expose the parent to
fines. If it were enough, the presumption would be impossible to
rebut, unless there is some legal or contractual obstacle to the
parent exercising any influence over the subsidiary. The parent
must be represented at the annual shareholders’ meetings,
accounts must be approved, and directors and auditors must be
appointed. This is merely the result of the fact that the parent
must make sure that it complies with the company law
applicable to the subsidiary. The parent company would
certainly risk fines if it appointed an employee or director of any
other company in the group as a director of the subsidiary, since
that might be considered to give the parent an economic
influence. But the parent would presumably be free to appoint
its own auditors as the auditors of the subsidiary, since auditors
cannot reasonably be said to exercise an influence on the
subsidiary’s conduct. In any other context, the parent’s
compliance with the basic requirements of the subsidiary’s
company law can hardly be considered as exercising an
influence sufficient to make the two companies into a single
enterprise.

68. Arkema SA v. Commission, Case C-520/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8901, ¶ 48. In
Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. I-393, what was described as an
investment company was held liable, on the basis of evidence of an annual budget,
monthly financial reports, and evidence of involvement of the parent in the subsidiary’s
affairs.
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XIII. COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPANY LAW OBLIGATIONS
OF THE PARENT
A third situation is where the parent company does the
minimum that is required by the company legislation applying
to the parent company itself. The parent may be required to
consolidate the subsidiary’s accounts, and to include some
reference to the subsidiary in its group reports. This means that
the parent must be able to verify that the statements it is
required to make are correct, and so it must be free to make
whatever enquiries are necessary to confirm this. It would be
unreasonable, and contrary to international comity, to say that a
parent company that fulfils the requirements of the company
law applicable to it has exposed itself to fines. If this were
enough to result in fines, the presumption would be impossible
to rebut. Verifying the situation is not exercising an influence.
XIV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARENT UNDER NONCOMPETITION LEGISLATION
The fourth typical situation is where the parent company
does the minimum that is required by other legislation applying
to it, such as anti-bribery or anti-money-laundering legislation.
The parent company cannot avoid having to comply with
legislation of this kind, once it has chosen to operate in the
jurisdiction in question. Again, the parent company must be
able to verify that whatever statements it is required to make are
correct. It would be unreasonable to say that a parent exposes
itself to fines from the Commission merely because it complies
with non-competition legislation in its home State.
XV. STOCK EXCHANGE OBLIGATIONS
The fifth situation is where the parent company’s shares are
listed on a stock exchange, normally, but not necessarily, in the
country where it is incorporated. Being listed is voluntary: a
company is not legally required to be listed. However, it would
be unreasonable, to put it no more strongly, to say that a parent
company has exposed itself to liability for fines if its shares are
listed on a stock exchange, and it carries out its obligations
under the rules applicable as a result. These obligations include,
of course, both the rules of the stock exchange in question itself
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and the rules resulting from the legislation applicable to quoted
securities, such as those applied by the US Securities and
Exchange Commission. It is hard to imagine that the
Commission or the European Courts would argue that merely
complying with stock exchange requirements is enough to make
the two companies into one enterprise, or to expose a parent
company to liability.
XVI. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW
If, as seems essential, a parent company is free to comply
with its own legal obligations without exposing itself to fines, it
must also be free to ensure that its subsidiary complies with
whatever legal obligations apply to it. It would be irrational to
expose a parent to penalties for trying to make certain that its
subsidiary complies with the law. General instructions to obey
applicable laws, not involving instructions to particular
subsidiaries (except insofar as they are subject to different
national legislation) could hardly be regarded as creating a
single enterprise or as exercising any economic influence of any
kind that would justify exposing the parent to fines. The Court
appears to have recognized in General Quimica69 that standard
instructions given to all the companies in the group cannot be
regarded as exercising a relevant influence over the economic
conduct of any particular subsidiary. It would be irrational and
indefensible if genuine efforts to make everybody obey all
applicable laws led automatically to liability. It would not only be
counter-productive, it would also be unjust. But in Schindler, the
Courts said that “the implementation of [a] code of conduct suggests
rather that the parent company did in fact supervise the commercial
policy of its subsidiaries”,70 although instructions to obey the law
would not normally be regarded as “commercial policy.”
If this were accepted, it would mean that an antitrust
compliance program imposed by the parent on all its
subsidiaries could not be used as evidence of the parent’s
influence over the pricing policy of any one of them.

69. General Quimica, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 101.
70. Schindler Holding and Others v. Commission, Case C-501/11 P, [2013] E.C.R.
I____, ¶ 114 (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet reported).
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XVII. THESE SIX PRINCIPLES
All of these six principles seem reasonable. None of them
describe situations in which there would be any reason to
believe that the parent and the subsidiary necessarily constitute
a single economic entity or enterprise. However, these
principles have not been officially stated, it is not clear whether
they are consistent with the case law (which itself does not seem
consistent), and it would be very helpful if they were made clear
by the Commission.
What is suggested here is that it should be stated clearly
that actions or situations of these six kinds do not create liability
for parent companies, since they are entirely compatible with
economic autonomy. It is not, and could not be, suggested that
a company that complies with these six principles cannot be
fined for some other reason. To avoid liability a parent company
must avoid all actions that lead to liability, not only some of
them.
If the parent company is liable in all or most of these six
situations, the conclusion seems inescapable: the presumption
cannot be rebutted in practice. If that were so, it would be
contrary to the European Convention and to the Charter, and to
the repeated statements of both Courts.
There is at least one other broad question of great practical
importance, which needs to be dealt with. That question
concerns the parent’s financial supervision over the subsidiary.
XVIII. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
As already mentioned, in Eni the Court said it would have
to be shown that the subsidiary “could act with complete autonomy
not only at the operational level but also at the financial level.”71
Autonomy, however, does not seem to be inconsistent with
financial reporting. The fact that the parent’s financial
supervision is limited to receiving financial reports has not so far
been accepted as showing the subsidiary’s autonomy.72 Indeed

71. Butadiene Rubber, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 68 (delivered May 8, 2013).
72. Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, ¶¶ 94–95; Arkema, [2009] E.C.R. II-180, ¶ 53.
It is not clear whether these were findings of fact in the cases before the General Court
or general statements about the legal effects of financial reporting.
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that might perhaps be considered evidence confirming the
presumption of control, or evidence of a single enterprise.
Financial supervision may take many forms. One typical
arrangement is that an investment by the subsidiary involving
more than a given sum of money must be approved in advance
by the parent, even if the parent is not giving any form of
guarantee. The parent’s approval obviously “influences” the
subsidiary’s conduct: the approval determines whether the
investment can be made. But, neither the granting nor the
refusal of the approval has any relevance to the subsidiary’s
pricing conduct, and there is no obvious reason why the right to
approve large investments should involve the parent in a risk of
fines. Nor is there any obvious reason why the power to
authorise large investments, without more, should create a close
economic relationship or a single enterprise.73 A bank may need
to investigate and approve a big investment that it is financing,
but nobody would say that the bank becomes part of the same
economic enterprise as the borrower. Financial support, without
directions, does not create a single enterprise. If the threshold
for approval is high, the parent is likely to be required by its own
legal and stock exchange obligations to satisfy itself that the
investment is appropriate. Even if the parent is not giving a
guarantee, a large investment by one company in the group may
significantly affect the price of the parent company’s shares. The
parent might reasonably decide that an investment of that size
would be better made in another country, or in another product
market, or at another time, or on other terms, or in another
currency. Financial safeguards are not the same as economic
influence on the subsidiary’s behavior on the market.

73. Advocate General Kokott, in Akzo, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, said the parent
company’s influence “as regards corporate strategy, operational policy, business plans,
investment, capacity, provision of finance, human resources and legal matters” may
affect market conduct. Id. ¶ 92. In Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case T-72/06, [2011]
E.C.R. II-400, ¶ 81, the Court said that the parent had authorized investments, and
approved budgets and pricing decisions, and that the fact that these actions had
concerned Sectors other than the products involved in the infringement was irrelevant.
The subsidiary had made monthly reports on its activity, and the Court considered that
this enabled the parent company to intervene whenever it wished. Id. ¶¶ 83–87, 90.
The exercise of control by the parent company is compatible with some organizational
autonomy. Id. ¶ 91.

1516 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1481
The most common form of financial supervision is regular
reporting by the subsidiary to the parent. In itself this does not
involve the parent company in the running of the subsidiary’s
business. It is true that reports may give rise to questions and
requests for clarification, but these do not involve the parent in
day-to-day operations either. A bank might require regular
reports from a large debtor. Authorization and approval do not
necessarily mean involvement.
In short, there may be obvious reasons why some degree of
supervision is justified and necessary, and no clear reason why its
exercise should involve the parent in the subsidiary’s conduct in
any way that should make the two companies into one economic
enterprise, or make the parent liable to fines. Yet, it seems that
the Commission has consistently argued that financial
supervision, without more, is enough to make the presumption
apply, and to make the parent company liable.74 If minimum or
normal financial supervision were enough to make a parent
liable, it would be difficult to say that the presumption was
rebuttable in practice.75
These questions concern the situation in which the parent
is only approving investments. Different issues are raised if the
parent is otherwise involved in the subsidiary’s affairs. If the
parent, under the guise of financial control, becomes involved
in commercial affairs, it is likely to create a single enterprise. But
the principles ought to be made clear.
How much difference should it make if the parent company
gives a financial guarantee? A guarantee might make it more
likely that the parent would supervise the subsidiary’s financial
position more closely, in particular if that position worsened for
any reason. Closer supervision might lead to more frequent or
more detailed reports, or to more elaborate forecasts or
projections. But, if closer supervision (with or without a
guarantee) did not lead to the appointment of a representative
of the parent to the subsidiary’s board, or some similar
arrangement or involvement, there is no clear reason why it
should necessarily lead to a risk that the parent could be fined.

74. See, e.g., Kendrion v. Commission, Case T-54/06, [2011] E.C.R. II-393.
75. See Leupold, supra note 14.
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At most, it merely suggests a closer relationship between the two
companies.
A variety of other situations can be imagined. If a parent
company gave instructions that no subsidiary should pay a bonus
of more than a stated percentage of the employee’s annual
salary that would be an instruction, but not one suggesting that
the companies constituted a single economic enterprise. If
instructions were given to ensure equal pay for men and women,
or more women on the boards of subsidiaries, that would not
create a single economic unit either.
In fact, there is no clear rationale for saying when a parent
should be liable to fines, if it has not been exercising economic
influence, or discussing or influencing the pricing conduct of
the subsidiary. The single enterprise concept is a description,
not a test. If influencing prices were the test, the fact that the
parent could have influenced pricing conduct is irrelevant, and
financial supervision, without more, would not justify fining a
parent company. The uncertainty into which the law has fallen is
largely due to the absence of any underlying principle or
rationale to be used for distinguishing cases in which the
supervision genuinely constituted evidence that the companies
were a single economic unit. The fact that a shareholder may
wish to be reassured that the subsidiary is not getting into
financial difficulties does not mean that the companies are an
economic unit in any other way. Unless the case law should
merely be regarded as the Commission’s efforts to justify higher
fines, some basic principle is essential.76
The Commission may say that close supervision gives
opportunities for influence, and in some circumstances that may
be so. But, the suspicions of officials are not evidence, and
companies ought to know what they can and cannot do without
involving the parent in risk. The present legal position, in which
76. In Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. II-184, ¶
[87-90], Advocate General Kokott said that it is “possible” to attribute the subsidiary’s
conduct to the parent if both form one economic entity, or if the subsidiary has no
autonomy, or the parent company exercises “decisive influence over its subsidiary’s
commercial policy.” A single commercial policy may be inferred from “the totality of
the economic and legal links between them.” Id. ¶ 91. However, in practice the
Commission relies on the presumption, and not (or not primarily) on evidence of this
kind. The Court confirmed that there cannot be an exhaustive list of the “factors
relating to economic, organizational and legal links.” Id. ¶ 65.
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not even the six principles set out above have been clearly
accepted, is difficult to defend.
Financial supervision is relevant to the question of “holding
companies.” In Schunk the Court said that the function of a
holding company is to manage the group of companies “as
one.”77 That may have been true in Schunk, but since the
concept of a holding company is imprecise and the phrase is
used in many different situations, the statement is at most a
factual generalization, and cannot be a rule of law. It is certainly
not always correct. The question whether companies constitute a
single enterprise as a matter of law cannot be answered merely
by using an imprecise and ambiguous label.
A company that is financially independent is likely also to
be economically independent, although financial independence
is not necessary for economic independence.
XIX. GROUP STRATEGY MEETINGS
Another common and well recognized practice in
multinational groups of companies is to bring together senior
executives of all the companies to exchange views and discuss
trends and strategies. The aim of such meetings is not for the
parent company to give instructions, but to gather ideas. Any
instructions that might be given would be given to all the
subsidiaries, not to any individual subsidiary, and would be given
openly. It is therefore unlikely that, if the parent wished to
influence the conduct of any particular subsidiary, it would
choose such an occasion to do so. There does not seem to be
any clear justification for regarding any conclusions that might
be reached at such a meeting as the exercise by the parent of
influence sufficient to make it liable if a subsidiary is
subsequently fined.
The Commission may say, of course, that it cannot know
what might be said informally at such a meeting, and the parent
might take the opportunity to influence a specific subsidiary’s
conduct. But it would be impossible for the companies to prove
conclusively that this had not happened, even if it had not. The
77. Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v. Commission, Case T-69/04, [2008] E.C.R. II-2567;
see also Eni v. Commission (Butadiene Rubber), Case C-508/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____,
¶¶ 64–67 (delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported).
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Commission does not conclude that prices have been fixed at a
trade association meeting, even if such a meeting would give an
opportunity for price fixing. A meeting of the companies of a
group which might constitute a single enterprise should not be
treated with more suspicion than a meeting of competitors.
However, the Commission may say that if the companies in
a group meet to discuss strategy or common problems, that
suggests that the group is seeking a common approach, and is a
single enterprise, even if it were clear that the parent never gives
instructions. This view would seem reasonable if all the
subsidiaries were in the same product market, but not if they
met only to discuss e.g., climate change, or the use of
information technology. The essential question seems to be
whether each subsidiary is economically independent (and
perhaps financially independent), not whether the subsidiaries
sometimes pool ideas on technical or non-economic matters.
It is perfectly possible for some subsidiaries to be
independent and others part of a single enterprise e.g., because
one subsidiary is only recently established, or is in a different
product market from all the others, or because the parent
company has involved itself in the activities of only one of the
subsidiaries.
XX. IF THE PRESUMPTION COULD NOT IN PRACTICE BE
REBUTTED, WOULD IT BE ILLEGAL?
It seems that two broad interpretations of the case law are
possible. The interpretation tentatively suggested here is that in
theory it is possible to rebut the presumption, although it is not
clear in what circumstances. The other interpretation is that the
only circumstances in which the presumption can be rebutted
are situations in which, for legal reasons, the parent company
could not have exercised any influence. This second
interpretation is suggested by Eni, and would seem to be correct
if the parent company would be liable in all six typical situations
described above.
The fact that the parent company cannot be fined if it
could not have exercised any influence cannot legitimise the
presumption. A presumption that can be “rebutted” only in
circumstances in which it could not apply can hardly be
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described as rebuttable. But if in every case in which a parent
company proves that it did not exercise influence in some
respects, it is said to have influenced (or to have been able to
influence) the subsidiary in another, the presumption certainly
seems to be irrebuttable in practice, in spite of what the Courts
have said. That is why the six typical situations seem important.
If a presumption that is justified as a rule of evidence
becomes irrebuttable without a legislative basis, even if there are
some exceptions to it, it is illegal because it is contrary to the
rights of the defence. A company cannot protest against an
absolute duty imposed by valid legislation, but if a rule is merely
one of evidence, there must be a right in practice as well as in
theory to defend oneself by producing contrary evidence.
So if in practice the presumption cannot be rebutted, it
seems clear that it would be illegal. Advocate General Mazak in
General Quimica said that the judgment of the ECJ in Akzo
“underscored the rebuttable nature of the presumption . . . . To
have found otherwise would, in my view, lead to a breach of
fundamental rights. The rebuttable nature of the presumption is
necessary in order to guarantee the rights of the defence and
access to justice of the parent company.”78 The Court in Elf
Aquitaine, Edison, and Air Liquide has said that the Commission is
legally obliged to ensure that the presumption is rebuttable in
practice.79 The Court in Groupe Gascogne repeated that the
presumption can be rebutted.80

78. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak, General Quimica and Others v. Commission,
Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 34. This view was confirmed by the Court in Elf
Aquitaine v. Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶¶ 59, 62, and in
General Quimica v. Commission, Case C-90/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-0001, ¶ 52. In Elf
Aquitaine the Court referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
in Janosevic v Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Reports 2002-VII, ¶ 101ff (July 23, 2002). Elf
Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, ¶ 62.
79. In Elf Aquitaine, [2011] E.C.R. I-8947, the Court said that the Commission is
bound, in order to avoid making the presumption irrebuttable, to explain its reasons
for saying the evidence is not enough to rebut it. Id. ¶ 153. In Air Liquide v. Commission,
Case T-185/06, [2006] E.C.R. II-2809, the Court stated that “[t]he Commission’s duty
to state reasons for its decision on this issue is clearly evident from the rebuttable
nature of the presumption.” Id. ¶ 75. The same phrase is used in Edison v. Commission,
Case C-446/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ (delivered Dec. 5, 2013) (not yet reported).
80. Groupe Gascogne v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I-____ (delivered
Nov. 26, 2013) (not yet reported).
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A presumption that in practice cannot be rebutted is a rule
of absolute liability. A rule of absolute liability, if it would be
permissible under the Charter and the European Convention
on Fundamental Rights, would be legal only if it was clearly
stated in legislation on the basis of sufficient reasons. It has not
been stated in any EU legislation.81
The fact, if it were the fact, that there are a few extreme or
unusual cases in which the presumption would not apply would
presumably not be enough to make the presumption legal, if in
most situations it could not be rebutted.
CONCLUSIONS—LEGAL CERTAINTY AND LITIGATION
It is widely believed by practising lawyers that the present
position is contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Insofar as
relevant, that principle says that European law rules should be
clear enough for a private party, having taken legal advice if
necessary, to know with some confidence what it may or may not
lawfully do.82 In the context of parent company liability, the
question is whether the parent company can know whether a
given relationship with its subsidiary would involve it in a risk of
fines if its subsidiary were fined. Plainly, the law does not now
enable a parent company to know that. It is not clear whether
the principle of legal certainty requires that a private party
should know whether and when it will be liable to a fine for an
81. See Bronckers & Vallery, supra note 14.
82. See, e.g., Flintan Duff and Others v. Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland,
and the Attorney General, Case C-63/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-569, ¶ 20; Ireland v
Commission, Case C-199/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-8027, ¶ 69; Thyssen Krupp Nirosta, Case
C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2359, (“[T]he principle of legal certainty requires that
such rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations
which are imposed on them and that those persons must be able to ascertain
unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly.”);
Heinrich and Other v. Commission, Case C-345/06, [2009] E.C.R. I-1659. The
European Court of Human Rights has ruled that:
In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of
law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the
Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in
terms of an unfettered power. Consequently the law must indicate with
sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent
authority and the manner of its exercise.
Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, Case C-4158/05, E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 76–77
(delivered Jan. 12, 2010) (not yet reported).
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infringement committed by another legal entity. It does not
even seem to ensure that a company must know how much it is
itself likely to be fined for a given infringement, except within
very broad limits. But it seems clear that the principle of legal
certainty means that a company should be able to know what it
needs to prove in order to rebut a presumption applying to it,
which has serious consequences if not rebutted. Saying that the
company is free to produce any evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption is not enough.
The unanswerable argument against the present state of the
law is that it is generating a great deal of litigation which is
occupying too much of the time of both the General Court and
the Court of Justice. Adoption by the EU institutions of at least
some of the principles set out above, including a clear statement
on the question of financial supervision, would greatly reduce
the scope for further court cases. It is true that if no specific
effort is made to clarify the substantive rules, the Courts’
increasing insistence on procedural requirements may gradually
clarify the substantive principles. But this would be slow,
cumbersome and expensive. It now also seems that it would be
damaging for the reputation of the Commission. The judgments
in General Quimica, Air Liquide, Edison, Elf Aquitaine, and Eni
require a new approach.
It is particularly important that the law should be clarified
because the Court of Justice, in order to save time and speed up
its work, has taken to dismissing the appeals of parent
companies by Orders without hearing oral argument and
without giving reasons that give guidance to the General Court,
to the Commission, or to companies.83 This practice, while
understandable, is clearly undesirable.
Clarification of the legal principles is also necessary to avoid
one unfair anomaly that results from the case law. Because it is
not clear what a parent company needs to prove, or what it
would be sufficient for it to prove, a parent company can now be
told that it has not made its argument precisely enough for it to
be admissible procedurally.
83. E.g., Total and Elf Aquitaine, Case C-495/11 P, [2012] E.C.R. I___ (delivered
Sept. 13, 2012) (not yet reported); United Technologies, Case C-493/11 P, (delivered
June 15, 2012) (not yet reported).
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The Commission, which has created this unsatisfactory
situation, should overcome the temptation to try to fine parent
companies in as many circumstances as possible, and take
effective steps to clarify the law and to reduce the volume of
unnecessary litigation. A constructive step of this kind is now
overdue. As the supposedly-rebuttable presumption is based
only on case law, the Court of Justice could take such a step at
any time. The Commission could, if it chose, state the principles
suggested above, and commit itself to apply them. That would
not be sufficient to resolve all the issues, but it would do much
to avoid litigation which the Commission cannot regard as
useful or productive.
The Commission is not well equipped for assessing the
economic links between parent and subsidiary companies. Few
Commission officials have training as judges, or experience of
private industry or of the practice of law. Even if the rules that
the officials should be applying were clear, they would not find it
easy to apply them satisfactorily. But the Court is right to insist
that the Commission should give reasons for its conclusions.
Reading all the judgments, one gets the impression that the
Court is trying to restrain the Commission, by insisting that the
presumption must genuinely be rebuttable, and by insisting, not
yet entirely consistently, that the Commission’s decisions must
be fully reasoned. If the Court finds it necessary to be stricter, or
if the Commission makes an effort to clarify the criteria in order
to minimise litigation, the situation may yet improve.
Advocate General Nils Wahl is reported as having said at
the Fordham Antitrust conference in 2013 that it is misleading
to refer to a presumption, and more accurate to refer to a rule
of law that parent companies are responsible for the actions of
their subsidiaries. He said that the Court should resolve the
conflicting judgments.
The need for clear and intelligible principles concerning
the liability of parent companies is especially great because of
two basic and well-known flaws in the Commission’s procedure.
First, the statement of objections and the decision are written by
the same officials: the case is not looked at objectively. It is
especially undesirable and inappropriate that the same
Commission officials weigh the evidence intended to rebut the
presumption. Second, the ultimate decision is adopted by the
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Commissioners, none of whom have read the evidence, heard
the arguments, or attended the hearing.84 Because of the basic
unfairness of the Commission’s procedure, it is particularly
unsatisfactory that the Commission has brought about a
situation in which parent companies that nobody suggests were
involved in the infringement are fined on a basis that cannot be
explained satisfactorily, even after so much litigation.
Under the “Community method” of legislating, the
Commission has the exclusive right to propose new measures for
consideration. There are good reasons for this, but it has the
disadvantage that, if a desirable reform or clarification would
inconvenience the Commission, it is unlikely to be proposed.

84. See John Temple Lang, Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the
European Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 1/2003, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 219 (Carl
Baudenbacher ed., 17th St. Gallen Int’l Competition Law Forum 2010, 2011).

